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Within the five short years since the European Parliamentary elections in 1999
Europe’s political spectrum has undergone a profound change. In the course of
national elections held in EU member states in that time-span, a shift in
governments’ composition, political style and public sensitivities denotes the
emergence of novel political cultures in Europe. These cultures escape the left–
right political identifications that have been dominant over the past century. By
way of articulating similarities in the electoral dynamics in EU member-states
in the past five years this study discerns the signs of this transformation in the
European political cultures, as a result of which the left–right alignment along
economic policies is being obliterated by a new fault-line: one which is dictated
by the security-risk dilemma of the ‘new economy’.
Electoral shifts to the right at the turn of the century
Four phenomena have shaped the political environment at the start of the new
century: The rise of the extreme right, recent electoral victories of centre-right
formations, the ideological shift of some traditional centre-left parties to the
right (Third Way, or Etat Social Actif in French parlance), and the relative decrease
of electoral support to traditional, non-reformed, left parties.1
On the whole, the recent political dynamics seem to be marked by the left’s
decline: eleven of the EU’s fifteen countries had socialist governments by the
late nineties. The exceptions were Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Ireland.
The 1999 elections for the European Parliament already signalled a general
tendency of decline in voter support for the left and a parallel increase of support
for the right, with a rise of 5.5 and a drop of 4 percentage points, respectively,
compared to the 1994 elections.2 The last rounds of general elections in EU
member-states (from the beginning of 1999 to early 2004) brought a series of
shifts to the right throughout Europe. Seven of the fifteen EU governments
(Denmark, France, Portugal, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Greece) shifted in
composition from left- to right-wing. Internal shifts to the right within the ruling
rainbow coalitions occurred in four of them (Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg,
Finland). By early 2004, only three EU member-states had preserved the domin-
ance of centre-left parties in government: Britain, Germany, and Sweden. No
shift took place from right to left in the formation of new governments before
March 2004, when the Spanish socialists won a surprise victory over the
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incumbent centre-right Popular Party which had a comfortable lead in polls
before the terrorist attacks in Madrid three days prior to elections instigated a
sharp reversal in public support.
At the turn of the century, the shift to the right deepened in the countries
that already had right-wing governments by the mid-nineties: Spain, Belgium,
Luxembourg and Ireland. Where the ascendancy of left parties was preserved—
Britain, Germany, Sweden and, until recently, Greece—it was due largely to an
internal shift to the right in the parties’ policy orientation, embracing a formula
of social liberalism, in the style of Tony Blair’s ‘Third Way’.
The series of shifts to the right in the structures of national governance
throughout Europe seem to indicate a stable shift in voter’s preferences and
consequently, a realignment in favour of the right. Yet, comparative results from
the two last rounds of national elections show that, at least numerically, the left–
right balance throughout Europe has not been significantly disturbed (Figures
1–2). Remarkably, a discrepancy between governmental shift to the right and
popular support for the left can be observed in the majority of member-states.
This discrepancy invalidates the thesis of stable realignment in favour of the
right. To be able to understand the nature of the recent electoral dynamics in
Europe, electoral outcomes should be examined in the light of the evolution of
the welfare state, as precisely this evolution has been the backdrop of political
mobilization in recent years. From that perspective, rather than a stable realign-
ment to the right, the reviewed shift to the right appears to be a vote against a
certain political culture and style of governance which, in different varieties,
had established itself throughout Europe in the past four decades. This perspect-
ive will lead us to identify the vote, first, as a protest vote: a reaction to a civil
and political crisis of the system of governance (the state) and of policy-making
(the parties) in Europe. Further, we will advance the hypothesis that this critical
vote is part of a larger and more stable transformation of Europe’s political
cultures away from the left–right alignment along economic policies, signalling
the formation of a novel ideological axis.
Figure 1. Left vs. right in past two parliamentary elections.
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Figure 2. Comparing results from the previous two parliamentary elections of EU member
states.
From quantitative to qualitative reading: the political cultures of the
European welfare states
The post-war welfare state consensus in Europe was enabled as much by the
centrist nature of European conservatism as it was by the strong leverage of
organized labour. Most of the conservative parties in continental Europe never
embraced totally free-market capitalism; instead, they opted for a ‘social market’
economy. Thus, the centrist conservatism of the German Christian Democrats,
for instance, provided a comfortable institutional framework for the welfare
state in much of Germany’s post-war existence (it has been the largest party in
every election except in 1972 and 1998).3 The conservative–socialist overlap on
social policies made possible the red–blue coalitions in most governments with
proportional electoral systems, such as the Netherlands and Belgium. Recent
ideological shifts of socialist parties to the right would seem only to confirm and
strengthen the consensual centrism on which the welfare state is founded.
However, it is this very consensus and the style of politics it generated, more
than the alleged unsustainability of its economic and social policies, which
has eroded the welfare state as a form of relationship between citizens and
governments.
Decades of conservative–socialist governmental cohabitation, and the con-
tinuing loss of ideological distinctions between centre-left and centre-right
brought about professionalized political establishments marked by a style of
politics based on elite policy making, compromise and consensus, increased
bureaucratization, absence of political debate or involvement of civil society.
Throughout Europe, ruling establishments were discredited by mismanagement
and corruption scandals in the nineties. To recall just a few examples: in Belgium,
the Dutroux scandal exposed grave weaknesses of the justice system. Later, the
hormone and dioxin scandals here revealed the absence of control over intensive
industrial agriculture, especially in Flanders. The Augusta helicopter scandal
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exposed corrupt political and financial practices that especially hit the socialists,
leading to a spectacular trial of numerous Socialist Party personalities in late
1998. In France, the contaminated blood case and a series of corruption allegations
against leading left- and right-wing politicians had a similar effect. A sequence
of administrative failures in the Netherlands allowed for a systematic defiance
of safety regulations and lead to the eruption of fireworks factory in 2000, and
a fire at a cafe´ that killed 14 young people at New Year’s Eve 2000–1. These
instances of political mismanagement increased public sensitivity to governance
deficiency throughout Europe.
In further support of the protest vote hypothesis is the fact that the fall of
incumbents at the century’s turn was carried out in conditions of good economic
growth and low unemployment. Despite the extraordinary prosperity that
Europeans enjoyed in the late nineties, the sense of anxiety and insecurity at an
everyday level was steadily growing, paralleled by a general loss of confidence
in governments. Despite economic growth, problems with the health system,
schools, public transportation, as well as growing urban violence, intensified.
The fact that national governments had done so well in economic terms made
these problems ever so harder to accept.4 Populist leaders (from Pim Fortuyn
in the Netherlands, to Haider in Austria and Le Pen in France) mobilized
unprecedented support by alleging that political establishments had left the
society in ruins. They made a link between the failure of some groups to become
integrated into society and crime, and managed to mobilize a widespread social
dissatisfaction with an administrative model of consensus building and avoiding
conflict at the price of escaping political responsibility.
In that sense, the tumbling of political incumbents in Europe in the late
nineties, combined with increased support for extreme right parties, can be
seen as a vote of non-confidence equally for the centre-left and centre-right
establishments that had dominated the political scene since the Second World
War. Rather than a genuinely right vote, this was a vote against a certain style
of old consensus politics void of clear principles and marked by privatization of
the public interest and short-term expediency.
Two particular electoral signals present further the critical vote not as a
simple realignment to the right, but as formation of a new political culture: the
persistent decline in voter turnout at elections, and the rise of support to
alternative political formations.
Researchers have repeatedly noted a long-term decline in people’s trust in
institutions over the past three decades. (This trend is often halted by economic
and political crisis, as the current Iraq emergency.) The growing political apathy
is manifesting itself in a low and decreasing turnout at elections throughout
Europe.5 The continually declining levels of electoral turnout points to an
incipient crisis of democratic legitimacy, caused by the sore relationship between
state and society. The consensual democracy of the European welfare state seems
to be degenerating into what David Arter has named a ‘demobilising polity’.6
Quite significantly, participation is not only low among the most disadvantaged
groups (a sad, but widely spread phenomenon linked to socio-economic determi-
nants of political culture); it is also declining among young, well-educated urban
voters.
The thesis that low turnout is indicative of a tacit revolt or, alternatively, of
civic alienation is not, however, uncontested. Low turnout is a probable outcome
European elections 115
of a change in the significance attributed to party systems, which is part of a
broader shift in the way people perceive the role of the citizen in democracy:
fewer and fewer regard the electoral vote as a civil duty or an effective instrument
for influencing the political agenda. Indeed, non-electoral political mobilization
(from protest movements to special interest lobbying) is steadily on the increase.
This means that declining electoral participation is not an unequivocal sign of
civil alienation, but of shift in what citizens perceive as valuable and efficient
channels for political input. From that perspective, the combination between
decline in electoral activity and the rise of non-electoral mobilization is another
sign for the emergence of new political cultures in Europe.
In many European countries, unconventional parties have lately become the
beneficiaries of the above-described discontent with mainstream politicians and
entrenched political hierarchies, or discontent with politics, altogether. The quest
for a new political culture has prompted the development of new parties or
movements (such as the White March movement in Belgium, Attack in France,
the Margherita alliance in Italy) or the refoundation and ‘renewal’ of existing
parties. A new left political force came into the political scene in Portugal: Bloco
de Esquerda (the Left Block, comprising the UDP, PSP and Politica XXI), and
attracted over 2.46 per cent with two deputies to the Assembly. In Ireland, the
Sinn Fein, an anti-establishment, all-Ireland party with a progressive social
agenda, had the most significant percentage rise in the 2000 general elections.7
Its electoral message was focused on rejection of old politics: ‘We are a party
that offers a real alternative to the stale and corrupt politics that have marked
life here for long. We are asking people to join with us in building an Ireland of
equals’, announced Sinn Fe´in’s leader Gerry Adams. The rise of new parties is
all the more significant because it goes against the trend of small parties’ terminal
decline in increasingly bipolarized political systems.
The preceding analysis established that the shifts to right-wing rule in Europe
do not necessarily indicate a long-term electoral advantage for the right. Nor
was the vote a simple protest vote against left political establishments. Although
at first sight it appears that concerns with order and security draw the vote to
the right, in fact the protest vote was cast against the old consensus politics of
the welfare state which, in many cases, were seen by voters as oblivious of the
changing social realities in Europe and linked to establishment’s complacency.
The electoral dynamics in the past five years indicate growing demand through-
out European publics for a new political style of governance and a change in
policy priorities to address new themes such as ethical issues, democracy,
stability and openness.
The withering of the left–right alignment
Although, as electoral results show, numerically the left–right balance is not
disturbed, it is the very left–right divide which is becoming obscured. We are
witnessing an end of left–right ideological vectors, driven by capital-vs.-labour
dynamics, and stretching between the pole of free enterprise against that of
(re)distribution.
Since the late eighteenth century, when the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ entered
the vocabulary of politics in France and spread throughout Europe, the nature
of the left–right cleavage has changed significantly a number of times. It was
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only after the Second World War that the left–right divide started to be based
primarily on the issues of free enterprise and state control of the economy. This
constellation lasted until recently. A number of studies in the last two decades
have begun to observe new shifts in the basis of political alignment. Thus,
according to Jean Laponce, the only stable core element of the left–right contrasts
now is ‘powers that be’ on the right and ‘the weak’ on the left, with ‘left’ and
‘right’ being a spatial translation of ‘up–down’.8
Apart from being a protest vote against the centre-left and centre-right political
establishment, the most recent elections seem to indicate a more specific and rad-
ical shift in Europe’s political cultures, deepening the crisis of left–right ideological
identifications through the appearance of new vectors of political alignment. As
it will be advanced further, this new fault-line in politics is the risk–opportunity
dilemma of the ‘new economy’—the novel socio-economic constellation that
appeared in post-industrial societies in the 1990s and is now dividing constituen-
cies according to the unequal distribution of opportunities and risks.
The emerging new alignment is signalled by two phenomena reoccurring at
national elections throughout Europe in recent years: changes in the political
agenda and the merging of left and right ideological programmes.
The nature of the agenda of political debate throughout Europe has changed
(both in terms of public sensitivities and official political discourse), moving
beyond the left–right divide over economic policies along the poles of free
enterprise and redistribution. Psephologists (specialists in elections analysis)
have established that, until recently, elections tended to be won on governments’
economic record, in line with the traditional (at least since the late nineteenth
century) left–right alignment on social policies. Surveys of general elections since
1998 reveal almost uniformly that this is no longer the case. Apart from the
usual focus on personalities rather than policies, analysts of national elections
in Europe at the very beginning of the new century often recorded a remarkable
absence of debate on social policies. Economic issues seemed to be disappearing
from the electoral agenda. For the first time in many years campaigns were no
longer centred on taxation, unemployment levels and redistribution, but on
political and economic insecurity. The omission of economics from the agenda
of recent electoral campaigning does not necessarily suggest that economics is
not a relevant political issue. Quite the contrary, labour-market reforms are
recently at the focus of policy-making; yet the marginalization of these issues in
election campaigning is due to the consensus on necessary reform of the welfare
state across the left–right ideological spectrum.
The formation of the new insecurity agenda in recent years has been
prompted by voters’ perceptions on the growing salience of the following four
large social trends.9
Physical unsafety
The massive spread of terrorist threats (after 11 September 2001, but also before
these attacks) has brought issues of political security (safety) to the fore; this has
coincided with a rise in urban criminality: cities have witnessed a growth in
crime, especially juvenile delinquency. Public anxiety has also been increased by
‘diseases coming from abroad’, such as BSE or SARS, or drugs).
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Immigration
Immigration has intensified and deepened protectionist instincts in society.10 It
is important to note that the perception of the growing salience of immigration
is not necessarily a consequence of immigration growth. Ghettoization, rather
than the volume of immigration, is at the route of growing societal concern.
While public anxiety grew over cultural mixity, which the larger public perceived
as a source of dropping standards of living (diminishing educational standards
at schools, for instance), the whole subject of immigration in the second half of
the twentieth century was placed at the margins of political respectability, thus
making it a taboo topic. Behind political correctness, which silenced political
forms of expression of social concerns, frustrations throughout societies grew.
Political crisis and democratic deficit
Endemic mismanagement and instances of corruption have undermined confid-
ence in the established mechanisms of political and economic governance. As
mentioned earlier, a series of scandals in the nineties exposed dysfunction of the
state and party system.
Economic slowdown and employment insecurity
Economic growth in Europe in the past two years has stalled or declined in a
number of EU member-states while unemployment is on the rise, together with
eroding standards of social security.
Surveys throughout Europe indicate the growing salience of the safety
agenda: restoration of the rule of law and political ethics become public priorities,
often overtaking the economic and social agenda. As a result, right-wing popu-
lism stormed onto the political scene in the late nineties campaigning to stop
new immigration, fight crime and rebuild neglected public services. Labour in
the Netherlands lost nearly half its seats in parliament to Fortuyn’s populist
party in 2002. Opinion polls in Netherlands prior to the January 2003 general
elections showed that the second priority (after fighting crime and increasing
security) was a call for the restoration of ‘norms and values’, a kind of moral
renewal inviting a return to civil behaviour, respect for the law and an end to
fraudulent business and political practices.11
The rise of right-wing populism at the very beginning of the century is being
followed now by mainstreaming of the extreme-right political agenda: the
Fortuyn, Haider and Le Pen legacy has changed Dutch, Austrian and French
politics by imposing their agenda and pulling all mainstream parties to the right.
Although right-wing populism is currently receding, public preferences for order
and stability do not falter. In fact, it is the incorporation of the safety discourse
into the political rhetoric of mainstream left and right parties that explains the
withdrawal of support to right-wing populism, not the diminished relevance of
the security-and-order agenda.
The sense of uncertainly which has been gathering momentum throughout
despite the economic boom of the mid-nineties is being currently increased by
three factors. First, the enlargement of the EU to include ten East European
countries as of May 2004 finds the population of EU member-states uninformed
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and unprepared. This risks enhancing cultural prejudices and thus deepening
the current protectionist instincts. Secondly, whether or not Europeans have
actually been more exposed to terrorist attacks, populations have become aware
of their societies’ vulnerability to terrorism.
The most important factor in intensifying the sense of uncertainty, however,
has been the recent deterioration of the economic environment in Europe, after
the economic boom of the late nineties. The peak in the Nasdaq stock index (of
the technology industry) was in March 2000; what followed were two-and-a-
half years of disastrous plunge. Economic stagnation has spread throughout
Europe reaching Germany, France and the Netherlands. The noticeable
weakening of growth in the eurozone and the diminishing consumer confidence
throughout Europe are deepened further by the uncertainty over possible
outcomes of the Iraq’s reconstruction effort.12 Despite recent signs of prospects
for economic recovery, the experience of economic decline, which followed the
unprecedented economic boom of the nineties, has induced a lasting shift in
public attitudes towards protectionism.
Overall, as a response to these new social trends, a new agenda of order and
anxiety has appeared with four constitutive elements: physical security, political
order, cultural estrangement and employment insecurity, as the economic compo-
nent of the mix. There have not been major policy alternatives to address the
theme of insecurity—analysts have observed repeatedly that there have been
few programmatic differences to distinguish between the major parties at the
last rounds of national elections. This has prompted authors to observe that the
opposition between left and right seems less clear-cut at the end of the nineties.13
A palpable phenomenon signalling the fusion of left and right policy agendas
is the recent shift of the centre-left towards the right. Socialist establishment
almost uniformly undertook, in a varied ratio between politics and rhetoric, a
shift to the right, first initiated by the British Labour Party led by Tony Blair.
With this, centre-left parties in continental Europe started to overlap with the
centrist position of conservative parties of the Christian Democrat family. With
the exception of Britain, European conservative parties after the Second World
War never completely embraced laissez-faire capitalism and instead adopted a
centrist position in terms of economic policies. With this, conservative parties in
continental Europe early on occupied the centre of the left–right political spectre.
The exceptional for Europe placement of the British Conservative Party clearly
to the right provided the vacant space in the centre of the left–right alignment
that New Labour took in the late nineties. This could not be the case in Europe,
where the socialist parties’ move to the right made them overlap with the
conservatives who had already taken the centrist space. In Italy and Greece it is
the centre-left parties that have recently surpassed the centre-right in their new
espousal of labour-market flexibility. Indeed, a shift to the right in the style of
Blair’s ‘Third Way’ was undertaken also by Italy’s centre-left (Social Democrats)
in the late nineties. We must note, however, that the motivations behind the
shift to economic liberalism of the Italian social democrats are different from the
shift of British labour to the right. Interventionism in Italy has been associated
with the right (in a ‘cooperation’ between economic and political elites), and
recent centre-left governments have sought to liberalize Italy’s political economy
in order to benefit the nation as a whole.14
With these shifts the Third Way, or social liberalism, has become the predom-
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inant policy paradigm in Europe, currently being embraced not only by leaders
of centre-left parties, such as France’s Lionel Jospin and Germany’s Gerhard
Schro¨der, but also by traditional conservatives such as Spain’s Jose´ Marı´a Aznar,
as well as many German Christian Democrats. The current policy orientation of
the French centre-right (the ruling RPR–UDF1 coalition under Chirac) can also
be characterized safely as a form of a Third Way (state-directed social liberalism),
as it displays all the main elements of this paradigm.
The novel political cultures of Europe: social roots and political essence
If the above-mentioned developments indicate the withering of the left–right
cleavage in politics they, by themselves, are not a sufficient evidence of the
appearance of new political cultures, that is, of new ideological axis of alignment
beyond left and right. Thus, the recent shift of socialism to the right could be
seen as a simple re-enforcement of the red–blue centrism typical of the welfare
state throughout the eighties. However, in the rest of this analysis we will argue
that the nature of political centrism itself has undergone a change in the nineties,
and thus given rise to new political cultures. At the root of this change are the
deep socio-economic transformations in Europe caused by the transition towards
high-tech, post-industrial global economy in the nineties. This, in turn, has been
translated into the appearance of new risk–opportunity political vectors, expressed
at three levels: (1) the new ideological basis of party competition, (2) new social
basis of party support and (3) new poles of political alignment.
The broad social background of the current changes in political identification
has been the spectacular economic growth of the eighties and nineties in all major
post-industrial societies, growth enabled by the revolutionary shift towards
sophisticated forms of technology. Analysts tend to describe the new stage of
the post-industrial constellation in the broad terms of the ‘knowledge society’,
or the ‘high-tech’ economies. Indeed, the relevance of specialized knowledge in
modern societies is ever-increasing. Yet, fundamentally, all modern societies are
knowledge-based societies, which makes the term ‘knowledge society’ inad-
equate to the qualitative changes now taking place: it fails to grasp the tensions
and transformations triggered by the economic developments at the turn of the
century.
The new economy (the high-technology stage of the post-industrial, global
economies) has induced profound changes in the organization of work and
lifestyle patterns throughout society. It revolutionized existing social and occupa-
tional structures, diversified the forms of ownership and created new career
opportunities and flexible employment options, which in turn increased personal
chances and lifetime choices.
The most significant social impact of the new economy has been the flexibiliz-
ation of existing class distinctions due to increased professional mobility and
the proliferation of forms of ownership and tenure within a person’s lifetime.
Throughout the twentieth century, occupational categories, such as ‘blue-collar’
and ‘white-collar’ workers, had already infused economic class distinctions.
However, the new economy increases the speed of entry and exit between
professional and social groups, thus putting an end to the relative fixity of
personal identity to one occupational/class group within an adult lifetime. What
gains maximum relevance for people is their chance (and not existing position)
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of upward, or risk of downward, mobility. Hence, the increased salience of the
risk–opportunity vectors in politics, which start to exist in parallel with the old
capital–labour orientation of left and right, and often replace them. The transition
towards the high-tech global post-industrial economy in the nineties is replacing
the old socialist–conservative consensus on the welfare state with a new division
along the lines of the opportunity vs. risk dilemma of the new economy. In this
sense, the socialists’ shift to the right is symptomatic of a new type of alignment
formed along the themes of employment security and risk, rather than the
capital–labour dynamics of conflict.
It is too early to make a full anamnesis of the social dynamics brought about
by the new economy. What can be established with certainty at this early stage
of the change is that the recent transformations and the intensity of pace they
take have inserted a sense of insecurity even for those fractions of the population
that were considered the uncontested winners of the technological boom of the
nineties. This at least partly accounts for the dominance of ‘order’ and ‘security’
themes in current political discourse, and thus to the cultural orientation of
voters to the right.
As a result of the political shifts analysed earlier in the study, the current
political agenda in Europe is dominated by a fusion between centre-right and
centre-left platforms into a new policy paradigm which combines a stress on
safety and authority (inherited from the traditional political right) and an
emphasis on economic liberalism and labour flexibility (the core of Third Way’s
social liberalism). Hence, although the political families of the left and right still
exist nominally, they have converted into a common ideological platform, centred
on the opportunities inherent in the new economy. On the other side of the
political spectrum are parties and their constituencies for which the new econ-
omy incurs rising risks: the fruits of labour-market flexibility, which translate
into lower incomes and reduced social protection.
Therefore, despite preserved differences in political culture, we can assert
that the new policy axis that aligns the old centres and the old extremes is the
opportunity–risk divide of the new economy. On this basis a realignment is taking
place between centre and periphery between, on one hand, the centre-left and
centre-right midpoint and, on the other hand, the circumference of far-right and
radical-left parties. In this new alignment, the new centre (a simultaneous shift
of the moderate left and right to the centre) becomes one of the poles in the
political axis, embracing the ‘opportunity’ side of the dilemma, while the far-
right and radical-left constitute the opposite pole responding to societal fears of
the hazards of the new economy of increased competition and open borders.16
This means that the old socialist–conservative consensus on the welfare state
which already blurred the ideological divide between the political left and right,
now under the impact of the new economy is being replaced by a left–right
consensus on the politics of ‘opportunity’, opposed by the far-right and radical-
left protectionist drive.17
Differences between centre-left and centre-right are being effaced not only in
terms of ideology and policy but also in terms of societal alliances and bases of
mobilization. Thus, the traditionally strong link between social democratic/
labour parties and trade unions is rapidly weakening (most striking current
example is Germany). Symptomatic of the declining relevance of the left–right
divide are also changes in the social composition of constituencies. Thus, surveys
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of the last French elections indicate that the typical voter for the socialists is
female, aged 25–30, educated and in middle or higher management or the
civil service, rather than the quintessential blue-collar male worker. The socio-
professional profile of the Le Pen constituency is working and middle class:
male, young (20 per cent), blue-collar (one in three), unemployed, self-employed
and small traders.18 The right (such as the German CDU or Austrian O¨VP or the
three rightist parties forming the Italian government) has a more or less firm
grip on those strata that can be appealed to through anti-establishment, anti-
foreigner and anti-European populism. Most successful has been the far-right
vote in areas where it can rely on subnationalist mobilization: Flanders, Northern
Ireland and Spain. However, there seems to be a strong second classifier, other
than class divisions, which currently determines voter’s preference of parties.
This classifier is the attitudes to employment possibilities along the risk-vs.-
opportunity divide brought by the new economy.
The old left and right extremes have come to overlap on two policy lines:
first, in their protectionist reaction to economic and social risk; and secondly, in
their increasing preference to national, at the expense of international, solidarity.
The fear of competition from immigrants on the low-skills labour market fosters
the traditional blue-collar constituencies of the radical left to embrace, albeit
tacitly, a nationalist reaction to global borders. The main lines of ideological
divergence that survive seem to be of purely cultural nature: the cultural
conservatism of the far-right vs. the cultural liberalism of the radical left.
Certainly, this is not the first time that the issue of insecurity and risk has
driven the redefinition of left and right political ideologies. The social security
policies of the post-war welfare state were a particular political reaction to the
opportunity–risk dilemma of industrial societies. The dilemma itself had already
appeared in the mid-nineteenth century and furnished the ideological divide
between socialism and liberalism, moving economic liberalism to the right of the
main ideological divide.19 The classical nineteenth-century cultures of economic
liberalism and socialist solidarity saw industrial capitalism from the incompatible
perspective of growing risks and opportunities for their respective constituencies
(labour and capital). The post-war welfare state managed to bridge the opportu-
nity–risk divide through a variety of social policies that aimed mainly at
minimization of risk (rather than increase of opportunities) as well a larger
distribution of the costs of risk-minimization. What we now witness is the re-
emergence of the opportunity–risk dilemma, this time in the context of post-
industrial, knowledge economies. The substance of the dilemma is now different
because behind it stand new mechanisms of social (re)production and stratifica-
tion, which are in turn translated into new grounds of political alignment and
party loyalty. The crux of the change is that certain kinds of knowledge linked
to the technological revolution of the late twentieth century (and not knowledge
as such) replace the ‘ownership of means of production’ category in the strati-
fication logic which in the late nineteenth century prompted the opportunity–
risk divide between the culture of economic enterprise vs. the culture of state-
sponsored social solidarity.
Most significantly for this analysis, the rapid diffusion of information and
communication technologies has incurred changes in work organization, which
have created new status cleavages. For certain professional categories the new
economy has meant increased employment opportunities, rapid career advance-
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ment and valuable job flexibility. Indeed, the pursuit of more than one career in
a lifetime is gaining ground among the younger generations in Europe. Studies
show that increasing number of professionals in their thirties and forties are
leaving stable well-paid jobs—not because of the economic downturn but to gain
more control over their lives. This has been beneficial for some of the traditionally
weaker sections of the population, such as mothers, allowing them the flexibility
they needed to combine child-rearing with a career.
Arguably, one of the most apparent social consequences of the globalized
high-tech economies is the increase of the middle class: due to intensified global
competition and the decoupling of many corporations, the weight of small
business would be increasing—small owners who have enriched themselves
during the stock-market boom and the economic recovery of the late nineties.
Within that hypothesis, the turn to liberalism would express the preferences of
the growing constituency of the middle class. This would only mean a return
towards the pre-welfare state constellation of left–right political cultures along
the lines of economic status (the traditional capital–labour vector).
However, despite assertions of the growth of the middle class resulting from
the overall increase of wealth in western societies, numerous studies indicate
that social groups have benefited from the economic growth of the nineties
unequally and the rift between rich and poor has deepened.20 Skills-based
technological change of the last decade has produced a shift in demands in
favour of highly skilled labour, especially in industries producing or making
extensive use of information and communication technology, while it has
worsened the employment and earnings prospects of unskilled and semi-skilled
workers, especially in the manufacturing sector. Thus, mobility, the most progres-
sive aspect of globalization, has proved to create significant downsides in terms
of risks, and to distribute these risks unevenly. It has deepened the rift between
two categories of people: skilled workers who can benefit from the opportunities
of the globalized economy, and unskilled labour that is affected negatively by
the rising risks. For instance, in the move of capital from western to eastern
Europe (prompted by cheaper labour) and the consequent disinvestment in the
North, the victims have been the least skilled workers, as they have been in the
previous wave of the movement of capital from North to South.
Rather than increasing the middle-class constituency, the new economy
deepens social differentiation. This new class differentiation along the lines
of career prospects inherent in the new economy furnishes the two general
constituencies of the opportunity–risk political alignment. Consequently, the
socialist–conservative consensus on the welfare state is evolving into a consensus
on the politics of opportunity (expressed by centre-left and centre-right, Third
Way, parties) vs. the fear of risk, embraced by far-right and radical left formations.
The mobility of economic, social and occupational structures, the insecurity
of the employment environment, the volatility of political preferences and voting
behaviour are the particular forms in which the transformative process of the
early twenty-first century finds its expression. In terms of electoral mobilization
the transitional nature of the described social dynamic translates into two
phenomena: first, the link between parties and electorates based on social class—
a link which, arguably, has been eroding throughout the twentieth century—
loses decisive relevance for electoral mobilization. Secondly, as a reaction to the
weakening of the class-alignment link, the capacity of parties to address urgent
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social concerns become the vital criterion in electoral mobilization, taking preced-
ence over voters’ ideological orientation or social background.
Politics after the Third Way
The social differentiation, and the consequent split in political cultures along an
opportunity–risk axis is being further fostered by the policy responses of Third
Way governments (be it centre-left, as in Germany and Britain, or centre-right,
as in France). The core of the Third Way policy turn consists in replacing
redistribution-orientated with employment-orientated social policy. As a con-
sequence, one of the most profound socio-economic developments of the past
few years (since the second half of the nineties) has been the turn to labour
market flexibility, a policy-trend largely and equally embraced by centre-left and
centre-right governments in Europe.
However, labour-market activation strategies, combined with the circum-
stances of economic slowdown in the past two years, are deepening further the
opportunity–risk schism dividing the two big electoral constituencies (skilled
and unskilled labour) of the new political constellation. In this process the latter
group increases faster, strengthening the grounds of the extreme-right/radical
left poles, which are mobilizing their electorate along the risk lines of the new
economy dilemma.
This by itself undermines the political credibility of the Third Way project
(the opportunity pole of the new political constellation), and erodes its electoral
basis. The negative social results of the Third Way policies have been growing:
while indeed managing to counter unemployment, economic liberalization and
growing labour-market flexibility have resulted in aggravating structural aspects
of unemployment and poverty. Studies show that unemployment throughout
Europe has increased in the last few years among young people and low-
qualified workers. The negative trend towards segmentation in the workforce is
rising steadily. Reintegration into the labour market has become more difficult,
while social security coverage is becoming ever less adequate to growing job
insecurity. It is likely that these negative outcomes of the reorientation of
European policies towards market liberalization will persists and will start to be
felt more acutely in the near future.
The new political reorientation along the lines of opportunities and risks,
which was outlined in the preceding part of the study, is still evolving under
the influence of the economic slowdown (in some cases, a downturn) that set in
at the end of the nineties and led to the currently widespread economic weakness
in Europe. The crisis of high-tech economies, a crisis which became socially
significant at the beginning of the new century and has just started to find its
political expression, indicates the emergence of a novel configuration between
new economy and old economy, with respective changes in socio-economic struc-
tures, the organization of work, national and European employment and educa-
tional policies and, finally, the formation of ideological attachment and political
preferences.
At the end of the nineties it seemed that the growing middle class of owners
of small-scale businesses, who had enriched themselves during the stock-market
boom and economic recovery of the late nineties, together with the group of
white-collar workers which evolved into the class of highly skilled professionals,
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would compose a stable social base for the centre-left and centre-right political
parties, embracing the politics of opportunity within the Third Way paradigm.
In the past economic conjecture of growth, the newly enriched middle class was
the group that disliked social spending and lent its support to Third Way
policies, which stressed opportunity (policies which in the final account benefit
large-scale capital). However, it is exactly the group of small and medium owners
that is now facing competitive pressures and is likely to reconsider their
belonging within the opportunity–risk dilemma. The current signs of gradual
economic recovery are not significant enough to invalidate this prospect by
tipping the social sensitivities of this group back towards the opportunity pole.
With increasing risk factors in the current economic slowdown this groups turns
into a group of volatile voters who would embrace the policy platform which
proposes the most convincing minimization of risk while keeping opportunities
available.
Notes
1. The anti-globalization movements and the most recent mobilization of public opinion
against military intervention in Iraq have been prominent in political discourse.
Nevertheless, these mobilizations are not discrete political phenomena, but rather
factors affecting policy-making and voting behaviour. Thus, anti-war protests in
principle facilitate the mobilization of the left electorate. However, linking the war
with security risks in Europe deepens already strong public sensitivity towards safety
and order and thus helps mobilize support for the right.
2. Source of electoral data: European Parliament \http://www.europarl.eu.int[.
3. The great designer of Germany’s post-war ‘social-market economy’ was Ludwig
Erhard, a Christian Democrat.
4. For a good account of the discrepancies between successful economic policy and civic
unrest see J. Eijsvoogel, ‘Behind the dikes there is bitterness amongst the tulips’, NRC
Handelsblad, 6 July 2002.
5. Unfortunately there are neither uniform future election data nor uniform voter-
preference data on the social and psychological bonds between voters and parties in
Europe. Also missing are uniform surveys in Europe on confidence in politicians, but
the trend is often reported in single country analyses.
6. David Arter, ‘The Finnish Election of 21 March 1999: Towards a Distinctive Model of
Government?’, West European Politics, Vol. 23, 2000, p. 185.
7. In fact Sinn Fein defies left–right classification.
8. Jean Laponce, Left and Right—a Topography of Political Perceptions, University of Toronto
Press, 1981.
9. We stress here popular perceptions of the salience of certain phenomena, which is
different from the real magnitude of the social issues in question. The object of this
study is not to judge the correlation between actual developments of such phenomena
as urban violence and immigration. This pertains to another study.
10. The perception of the growing salience of immigration is not necessarily a consequence
of immigration growth. The ghettoization, rather than the volume of the immigration
is at the route of the growing societal concern.
11. Marlise Simons, ‘Dutch parties neck-and-neck in exit poll on elections’, International
Herald Tribune, 23 January 2003, p. 1.
12. According to the International Monetary Fund the war in Iraq is likely to cut the pace
of global economic growth in half : to 1.5 per cent from 3 per cent in 2002, International
Herald Tribune, 18 February, 2003, p. 10.
13. See, for instance, P. Perrineau, ‘L’affaiblissement de l’antagonisme gauche/droite’, La
V-e`me Re´publique, permanence et mutations, Cahiers Franc¸ais, Vol. 300, 2002, pp. 48–54.
14. Mark Donovan, ‘A New Republic in Italy? The May 2001 Election’, West European
Politics, Vol. 24, 2001, p. 205.
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15. RPR: Rally for the Republic (Conservative, Neo-Gaullist); UDF: Union for French
Democracy (Conservative).
16. The (quasi) novel rhetoric of opportunities and risks has been noted, in varied terms,
by a number of analysts, and it is usually attributed to globalization. However, no
connection has been made to political realignment, fostered not so much by globaliz-
ation, but by the dynamics of the ‘new economy’ (globalization focuses on the scale,
rather than the quantitative changes of the new economy).
17. The described realignment is less salient in the south of Europe, which has been
marked by stability of the socialist governments (Portugal, Greece) and a numerically
strong left vote (Italy). Politics in these countries are still marked by what the
Portuguese prime minister Guterres called ‘structural backwardness’, which despite
all the progress made during the last decade divides these countries from most of
their European counterparts. Here issues of structural development are still the fault-
line of the left–right divide between the pole of free enterprise and redistribution.
18. Arnauld Miguet, ‘Election Report. The French Elections of 2002: After the Earthquake,
the Deluge’, West European Politics, Vol. 25, 2002, p. 209. There are unfortunately not
uniform studies of the nature of voter constituencies throughout Europe.
19. When the left–right constellation first appeared in the late eighteenth century,
economic and political liberalism stood to the left, as against adherence to tradition,
which formed the ideological core of the right.
20. People in Europe: EUROSTAT report, March 2003.
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